Hypnotic involuntariness and the classic suggestion effect

Vince Polito
School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3242-9074

Spencer E. Arbige
School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9565-0791

Correspondence: vince.polito@mq.edu.au

Keywords: agency, involuntariness, effortlessness, automaticity

When individuals respond to hypnotic suggestions, there are sometimes clear behavioural indicators that the hypnotic interaction is having an impact. For instance, a hypnotised person may raise a hand or hold an arm rigid following a suggestion to do so. But this alone is not particularly striking; anyone can move their body when prompted. Rather, it is the accompanying subjective changes to one’s internal experiences that make hypnotic suggestions an intriguing psychological phenomenon. Typically, we have a feeling of control, or sense of agency, over our actions and thoughts. By contrast, a key feature of hypnotic responding is that relatively simple communications from a trained professional can lead to dramatic reductions in an individual’s sense of agency, such that hypnotic responses feel as if they are occurring involuntarily (Polito et al., 2013). This reduced sense of agency is consistently reported by high hypnotisable participants, and has been the focus of considerable research (Woody & McConkey, 2003). Weitzenhoffer (1974) described this reduction in agency as ‘the classic suggestion effect’ and considered it a defining feature of genuine hypnotic responding (however involuntariness can also occur when responding to non-hypnotic suggestions; Barber et al., 1974).

But does this feeling of involuntariness mean that responses to suggestion truly are automatic? This is a complicated question. A number of researchers have analysed hypnotic responding in terms of generally accepted criteria for automatic processes and proposed that, technically, responses in hypnosis do not show features of automaticity. For example, Lynn et al. (1990) argued that hypnotic responses are not inevitably evoked by specific stimuli and do appear to require cognitive resources. On this view, hypnosis leads to an experience of involuntariness but does not actually change the mechanisms of action production. This interpretation is consistent with theoretical accounts proposing alterations to executive monitoring processes (e.g., dissociated experience theory and social cognitive theories) and disruptions to higher order thinking (e.g. cold control theory; for an overview of hypnosis theories, see Zahedi et al., 2024).

On the other hand, there are some empirical findings indicating that hypnotic suggestions can, in some contexts, lead to changes in behaviours that would typically be considered automatic. For example, King and Council (1998) reported that for a subset of individuals, hypnotic performance can occur with low levels of intentional control, and Polito et al. (2018) showed that particular hypnotic suggestions led to participants inhibiting correct quiz responses in a highly automatised task. These findings emphasise changes in executive functioning and are consistent with dissociated control theory (Woody & Bowers, 1994).

Regardless of the mechanisms underlying agency change in hypnosis, the subjective sense of involuntariness may be a factor that facilitates acceptance of hypnotic suggestions (Lynn et al., 2022). In particular, the feeling of involuntariness may lead to suggestions being processed with low levels of conscious critical introspection, and activation of top down regulation of cognitive processes with minimal metacognitive awareness. This may in turn increase the potential of hypnotic suggestions to interrupt habitual patterns and engage new behaviours.

References
Barber, T. X., Spanos, N. P., & Chaves, J. F. (1974). Hypnosis, imagination, and human potentialities. Pergamon Press.

Lynn, S. J., Cardeña, E., Green, J. P., & Laurence, J.-R. (2022). The case for clinical hypnosis: Theory and research-based do’s and don’ts for clinical practice. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, 9(2), 187–200. https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000257

Lynn, S. J., Rhue, J. W., & Weekes, J. R. (1990). Hypnotic involuntariness: A social cognitive analysis. Psychological Review, 97(2), 169–184. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.97.2.169

Polito, V., Barnier, A. J., & Connors, M. H. (2018). Hypnotic clever hands: Agency and automatic responding. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147(6), 815–828. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000451

Polito, V., Barnier, A. J., & Woody, E. Z. (2013). Developing the Sense of Agency Rating Scale (SOARS): An empirical measure of agency disruption in hypnosis. Consciousness and Cognition, 22(3), 684–696. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.04.003

Weitzenhoffer, A. M. (1974). When is an ‘instruction’ an ‘instruction?’ International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 22, 258–269.

Woody, E. Z., & Bowers, K. S. (1994). A frontal assault on dissociated control. In S. J. Lynn & J. W. Rhue (Eds.), Dissociation: Clinical and theoretical perspectives (pp. 52–79). Guilford Press.

Woody, E. Z., & McConkey, K. M. (2003). What we don’t know about the brain and hypnosis, but need to: A view from the buckhorn inn. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 51(3), 309–338. https://doi.org/10.1076/iceh.51.3.309.15523

Zahedi, A., Jay Lynn, S., & Sommer, W. (2024). How hypnotic suggestions work -A systematic review of prominent theories of hypnosis. Consciousness and Cognition, 123, 103730. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2024.103730