Phenomenology of hypnosis: Methodological considerations

V. K. Kumar, PhD
West Chester University of Pennsylvania

Correspondence: kkumar@ wcupa.edu

Keywords: hypnosis, phenomenology, neurophenomenology, subjective experiences

A hallmark concept of phenomenology is the qualitative study of the structure of consciousness (what and how of experience) while experiencing a certain event such as hypnosis. It intends to describe the essence/meaning of “lived experiences” from the experiencer’s perspective (Neubauer et al., 2019). There are a variety of phenomenological approaches, some require interpreting data free from one’s biases (e.g., Husserl’s Transcendental Descriptive), others allow for observer bias (e.g., Heidegger’s Hermeneutic Interpretive approach, where observers reflect on the participant’s experience and simultaneously their own) in the interpretive process. Both aim for a “bracketing” approach to gathering first-person reports, where investigators seek to become aware of and minimize their own theoretical and experiential biases to capture the essence of the participants’ “lived experiences” (Neubauer et al., 2019). Few studies in hypnosis, to date, meet such demanding requirements of phenomenological research even though they may include the terms “phenomenology” or “phenomenological” in their titles and write-ups (see Woodard, 2003, for a detailed review/critique of such approaches.)

Woodard (2003) describes as quasi-phenomenological (a) Shor’s (1979) “phenomenological” Method, (b) Sheehan and McConkey’s (1982) Experiential Analysis Technique, (c) Varga et al.’s (1994) Parallel Experiential Analysis Technique, and (d) Pekala’s (1982) use of the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI) because they maintain a quantitative emphasis or use structured questionnaires and response scales. Pekala (2015), however, describes his approach as “quantitative, phenomenological analysis, or noetic analysis” distinguishing it from the “descriptive, non-quantitative phenomenological analysis of the psychological phenomenologists …” and neurophenomenology (p. 405, italics in original). He refers to his method as analyzing statistically/quantitatively “first-person reports about the qualia of consciousness” (p. 405).

Varela (1996) used the term neurophenomenology to denote a “style of inquiry” that connects modern cognitive science (third-person accounts) with “a disciplined approach to human experience [first-person accounts]” (p. 330, italics in original). He explained that “neuro refers to the entire array of scientific correlates which are relevant in cognitive science” (p. 330 footnote). As an example of a recent neurophenomenological study, consider Cardeña et al. (2013), who examined neural substrates (using EEG) of spontaneous (unsuggested) hypnotic experiences (open, detailed first-person reports) while experiencing neutral hypnosis, where “no explicit suggestions are administered during or after an induction, other than to become hypnotized” (p. 376). Two raters (one masked to participants’ hypnotizability) identified nine experiential categories (imagery, normal cognition, body alterations, environmental alterations, exceptional, negative, relaxation, and loss of control) from participants’ first-person reports, and related these changes to Omega Complexity, and other EEG measures. Other neurophenomenological studies (e.g., Rainville et al., 2019), have employed self-report scales to assess subjective experiences during hypnosis.

The use of different methodological approaches for understanding subjective experiences during and after (short and long-term post-hypnotic effects, something we know little about) hypnosis is crucial to both theoretical and applied advancements. Thus, none of the phenomenological, quasi-phenomenological, or quantitative phenomenological methods described above should be considered “inappropriate”—they all have contributed and have the potential to further contribute to understanding the experience of hypnosis.

References
Cardeña, E., Jönsson, P., Terhune, D. B., & Marcusson-Clavertz, D. (2013). The neurophenomenology of neutral hypnosis. Cortex, 49(2), 373-385. Doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2012.04.001

Neubauer, B.E., Witkop, C. T., & Varpio, L. (2019). How phenomenology can help us learn from the experiences of others. Perspectives in Medical Education, 8(2), 90–97. Doi: 10.1007/s40037-019-0509-2

Pekala, R. J. (1982). The Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory. Mid-Atlantic Educational Institute.

Pekala, R. J. (2015). Hypnosis as a “state of consciousness”: How quantifying the mind can help us better understand hypnosis. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 57(4), 402-424. Doi:10.1080/00029157.2015.1011480

Rainville, P., Streff, A., Chen, J-I., Houzé, B., Desmarteaux , C., & Piché, P. (2019). Hypnotic automaticity in the brain at rest: An arterial spin labelling study. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 67(4), 512-542, Doi: 10.1080/00207144.2019.1650578

Sheehan, P. W., & McConkey., K. M. (1982). Hypnosis and experience: The exploration of phenomena and Process. Brunner/Mazel.

Shor, R. E. (1979). A phenomenological method for the measurement of variables important to an understanding of the nature of hypnosis. In E. Fromm & R. E. Shor (Eds). Hypnosis: Developments in research and new perspectives (2nd ed, pp.105-135). Aldine.

Varela, F. J. (1996). Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3(4), 1996, 330-349.

Varga, K., Banyai, E. I., & Gosi-Greguss, C. (1994) Parallel application of the experiential analysis technique, with subject and hypnotist: A new possibility for measuring interactional synchrony. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 42(2)130-139. Doi: 10.1080/00207149408409346

Woodard, F. (2003). Phenomenological contributions to understanding hypnosis: Review of the literature. Psychological Reports, 93(3), 829-847. Doi:10.2466/PR0.93.7.829-847